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## Voices from the ranks

F. L. Carsten

ULRICH KLUGE:

Soldaten und Revolution  
Kritische Studien zur Geschichts-  
wissenschaft 14  
518pp. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck  
und Ruprecht, DM92.

The German revolution of 1918 intrigued many historians and political scientists. Was it a genuine revolution and, if so, why did it impetus evaporate so quickly? If its principal achievement was the introduction of parliamentary democracy, was it not unnecessary since the change had been brought about by the constitutional reforms of Prince Max of Baden, which made Germany a constitutional monarchy a few weeks before the outbreak of the revolution? Was not the true revolution a "revolution from above" which anticipated the revolution from below? Ideas such as these were first put forward by the eminent left-wing German historian Arthur Rosenberg nearly a century ago and have been repeated many times since.

In the 1960s a younger generation of German historians began the serious study of the events of 1918-19 and the publication of the principal sources. Eberhard Kolb's *Die Arbeiterbewegung in der deutschen Innenpolitik* (Düsseldorf, 1962), a detailed study of the workers' councils, broke new ground and established the great importance of the council movement in Germany, which was clearly inspired by the Russian soviets yet very different in character. Exactly as in Russia, the German councils were councils of workers and soldiers, but in Germany the peasants played only a subordinate role in the council movement. This clearly was one of the weaknesses of the movement: one of the causes of its early decline.

Although the workers' councils have been studied in great detail by historians in both Germany and elsewhere, there has been no comparable study of the soldiers' councils, which in most places worked in harness with those of the workers. Ulrich Kluge's *Soldaten und Revolution* attempts to fill this gap. Drawing his material from many scattered archives and other sources, Dr Kluge describes the activities of the soldiers' councils, their demands, their ideas about the formation of a democratic army, their services in bringing back the German armies from the occupied parts of eastern Europe, their clashes with the military High Command, and their quick disappearance from the political scene. But the title of the book is rather misleading, for Dr Kluge deals above all with the struggle for power during the three months following upon the outbreak of the revolution. This was a many-sided struggle between the new government of the People's Representatives, the High Command under Hindenburg and Groener, the workers' soldiers' councils, and many different military units such as those returning from the front, the various *Volkswehren*, and finally the new volunteer formations or *Freie Corps*.

As is well known, it was the High Command which supported by the military police, emerged triumphant from this struggle for power and succeeded in imposing its will upon the weak and divided government. Following the view of Professor Kolb, Dr Kluge does not believe that this was the moving force of the so-called "revolution from above" of the social-democratic leader Friedrich Ebert and General

Groener concluded on November 10, 1918, a day after the outbreak of the revolution. In his opinion the new government merely instructed the High Command to carry out Germany's obligations under the armistice treaty and to bring back the German armies from the occupied territories in west and east. In this view the political alliance to fight against Bolshevism in Germany was only concluded six weeks later on December 22, when forces under the orders of the High Command were used to try to evict a "red" cabinet from the palace in Berlin: events that led to the breakdown of the coalition government of right-wing and left-wing social democrats, and ultimately to the disastrous "Spartanist" Räterepublik of January 1919 and its suppression by government troops.

Yet this seems a somewhat mechanistic interpretation of the events of November and December. What began as a declaration of loyalty of the High Command towards the new government from which it expected the preservation of law and order, and the early summoning of a constituent assembly, quickly developed into an "alliance" not so much against "Bolshevism" (which was extremely weak), but against the workers' and soldiers' councils; in the eyes of the ministers, they threatened to create "chaos" by their interference with the customary processes of government and their demands for democratization of the administration as well as the army. Among the partners of this "alliance" the government was much the weaker and needed the support of the military.

Already on December 8 Hinden-

burg had put forward their political demands, strongly directed against the workers' and soldiers' councils, in the form of an ultimatum. On December 23 Groener wrote in his diary that he telephoned Ebert and demanded from him that he accept our protection. Otherwise we can no longer go along with him. What began as an understanding on certain more or less technical issues had become an "alliance" in which one side was able to dictate to the other.

Why did the social-democratic ministers accept these demands and make no attempt to dispose with the services of the officer corps, even after the safe return of the German armies and the virtual completion of demobilization? Dr Kluge emphasizes two factors: the "unshakable belief in the loyalty of the officer corps in general and of the High Command in particular," a belief partly due to the conviction that the old order was dead; and the ministers' hostility to the more radical socialists and the council movement (which they identified with "chaos"). They were much overestimated the danger threatening from the extreme left and they colossal underestimated the danger coming from the right. The fatal misjudgment of the situation was no doubt largely caused by a fear that Germany might go the way of Soviet Russia, that a more radical revolution might follow the first, moderate revolution. Yet in truth the situation of the two countries was very different, and the German *Spartanist* revolution was a minority who only gained strength from the punitive expeditions of the Free Corps, the forces created to combat the alleged "Bolshevik danger".

## Essays in a lost cause

By George Mikos

ANDRÁS RÉVAY:

A Titled Magyar  
Selected Essays  
Introduction by Zoltán Szabó.  
210pp. Szeged: Csömör, 1973.

András, or Andrew, Révay—the son of a well-known Hungarian nationalist—was a London correspondent of the German-language *Budapest daily, Pester Lloyd*. Soon after Hungary's involvement in the Second World War, he, with two friends—Árpád Zsolt and György Szabó—left Hungary and moved to London. Dr Révay, who was a member of the Hungarian resistance movement, wrote a letter to *The Times* in which he described his loyalty to the anti-fascist Hungarian regime and offered their help and services to the Allies against the common enemy. He believed that this was the way to save the true Hungary from the Hungarian people. The signature to the letter was "András Révay". They formed, with some others, an organization, called the Association of Free Hungarians in Great Britain. After the suicide of Árpád Zsolt, Révay became its president (and, in the later years, its honorary secretary).

Révay was indefatigable in informing the British public of the situation in, and problems of, Hungary. Most of the essays in this book were first published in English and have now been translated into Hungarian by Zoltán Szabó and published by a small literary circle of Hungarian intellectuals from a new generation of writers. The interest of these essays is that, like *Hitler's Hungary*, they trace

certain historical moments and throw a spotlight on various situations, half forgotten or at least hardly ever discussed nowadays. Révay's essays are somewhat flat and tedious, some of his forecasts—for example that China would remain a Soviet satellite—are patently wrong. But he has a first-class analytical and selective memory and a keen knowledge of history. These latter qualities raise the essays above the level of political journalism and make them worth preserving.

The first essay deals with the post-war expulsion of Hungarians from Czechoslovakia. Magyar-Czechoslovak relations have been long and troubled and neither side can claim much credit for itself. The Magyar were the masters of the Slovaks for several centuries. In the interwar period they were an oppressive and arrogant masters at that. This, however, did not make the Treaty of Trianon (1920) a just victors' award for the First World War and punished for her so-called crimes. Large territories with Hungarian majorities were given to new Czech state—and two others. Militant Hungarian revisionism was the explosive reply. It bore fruit after Munich. The Hungarians, like the dying body of the Czechoslovak state, were given a compromise between communism and British-style socialism would have been accepted had it run parallel with the Soviet Union. A debatable point even if anyone could have foreseen such curious and contradictory sentences. The death-knell of the Third Hungarian Republic was Révay's and Tótt's from the French and Italian governments in

Another factor, which is not mentioned by Dr Kluge, was the danger threatening the eastern provinces of Prussia from the Poles, the German desire to hold on to the disputed areas and, if possible, to reconquer the province of Poznań. The German desire to hold on to the disputed areas and, if possible, to reconquer the province of Poznań. The German desire to hold on to the disputed areas and, if possible, to reconquer the province of Poznań.

With the very detailed discussion of the politico-military events, the subject of the soldiers' councils tends to recede into the background. Yet the reader would like to know more about their activities and their composition. We are told, for example, that during the first week of revolution, twenty-five "selected" soldiers' councils consisted of only eighty-three private soldiers, but ninety-three (professionals) NCOs and nineteen officers. This is the only evidence not informed whether this was typical, or whether in later months the preponderance of NCOs and officers disappeared.

The author repeatedly emphasizes that the aims of the soldiers' councils were reformist and not revolutionary: they wanted the war to be brought to a speedy end and a constituent assembly elected as quickly as possible. Politically they tended in their large majority towards the right-wing, social-democratic and hence quickly became suspect in the eyes of the left-wing socialists.

Yet it was under the influence of the soldiers' representatives that the national congress of the workers' and soldiers' councils

abominable. They made no distinction between loyal and disloyal Hungarians, between democrats and Nazis; only active resisters were spared. In August, 1945, Hungarians lost their property and even their right to work and 25,000 were expelled or taken to Bohemia for forced labour.

In these essays Révay did not only record history but was trying to influence it. In those days, communists were the most vociferous protesters against the summary acts of Czechoslovakia. Révay expressed his firm belief that if they were expelled or taken to Bohemia for forced labour.

Revály's most interesting essay deals with the 1947 elections, the only free elections ever held in Russian-occupied territory. This essay contains a masterly analysis of the parties, their origins and interests. The government coalition signed 274 seats, the opposition 140. Révay expresses his firm belief that if they were expelled or taken to Bohemia for forced labour.

Hungary's friendship with the West, he thought, would have been accepted had it run parallel with the Soviet Union. A debatable point even if anyone could have foreseen such curious and contradictory sentences. The death-knell of the Third Hungarian Republic was Révay's and Tótt's from the French and Italian governments in

"France at the crossroads" an article in Scribner Magazine in 1936, was illustrated by these lithographs of Blum, Doriot, Chagall, Harriot, and Thorez by Charlot, a Frenchman who has lived in Hawaii since 1949. They appear in Jean Charlot's Prints, a catalogue raisonné of his work by Peter M. Jones, published jointly by the University of Hawaii Press and the Jean Charlot Foundation, Honolulu. (450pp, including over 700 illustrations, and 29 colour plates, \$85).

adopted in December 1918 the "Hamburg Points" which demanded the removal of all high rank and epaulettes, the election of officers by the units, and to ensure a permanent influence of the soldiers' councils within the army which was to be a *Volkswehr*, a kind of popular militia.

These were radical demands rather than socialist demands, they aroused the wrath of the High Command which simply refused to accept the government's proposal. Whether an efficient army could have been created on the basis of such a programme is another question which is not discussed in this book. But then the little doubt that quite often the *Volkswehr* units came from different parts of Germany (and Austria) and that the *Volkswehr* presented a real alternative to the restoration of the Prussian military system. In this respect too, the High Command refused the day after the Treaty of Versailles imposed small highly professional army Germany.

The value of this study lies only in the accumulation of a detailed material on military actions in the first months of the German revolution, but also in the views and shibboleths. If some ideas are less revolutionary than the author seems to think, if some of them are stated more than once, this may perhaps be a psychological phenomenon, as a collective sentiment of denial and expectation. Like the idea of the crusade in the Middle Ages, to which it has sometimes been compared, nationalism preceded and announced the real crusades, which were directly or indirectly supported by the state. This phase of growth is now at midstream. The trumpeting headlines, inaugural addresses and royal commissions persist; but nationalism is also influencing the education system and even the fabric of society. People living in Canada have grown used to marching music and symbolic parades. It is no longer considered unusual for a government body to take a position against outsiders, foreigners in Canada, or unachieved Canadians. Popular opinion has been aroused and at the moment a consensus in a land whose habitable regions are about as wide as the Low Countries and two thirds as long as Russia. Even a few years ago it would have been hard to think of un-Canadian activities, now there are several possibilities. Then the cultural scene had a few high priests but no established church. Now it has one, presided over by the gurus of the literary and publishing world, who close cooperation with the other media. One inevitable consequence of a dominant church and ideology is the proliferation of sectarian movements and heresies.

Rejections of nationalism are now commonplace. If the majority of Canadians are pleased with their country's new assertiveness, an increasingly articulate minority is dismayed at the narrowness of focus and obvious self-indulgence. And Melnick's problem has resurfaced. Some nationalists appear to believe that the state is capable of legislating a national culture into existence. The more sensible ones have their doubts.

The issues are complex. It is not easy to take a position for or against. It is also more difficult than ever to explain to outsiders what is happening in Canada. Not so long ago there was no concept of a reader anywhere could pick up Northrop Frye's *The Educated Imagination* and be reassured that from time to time, sophisticated interpretations of literature originated in Canada. This study boasts no "beavers" or

CANADA 6

# The vicissitudes of nationalism

By Brian Stock

Is culture at the national level a product of the state or is the state itself a product of a nation's culture? Friedrich Meinecke asked this question some seventy-five years ago in his well-known study, *Welchertum und Nationalstaat*. His answer: while the state may act as an influence, it does not originate cultural activity. The state is "simply one product of the national culture along with others".

Concern over nationalism has long since waned in France and Germany, where Meinecke saw it unfolding along with romantic political theory. But it is still a central force in the less developed countries of Asia and Africa, as well as in developed nations with a colonial past. In Canada a dormant national movement was awakened in the 1960s (see TSL August 28, 1969, and October 26, 1973). Since that time, nationalism has furnished a mooring-ground for the economic and cultural issues that have troubled the country for a century. Both English and to a lesser degree, French Canadian cultural patterns first appeared in the nineteenth century, during the same period in which Canada, as a geographic entity, was created in the industrial Revolution. The momentum that carried the first cultural sensibility at the national level. Ever since, laws that governed publishing, radio, cinema and television. Although individual cultural achievement can never be reduced to economic relationships, the future of culture at the national level is closely tied to the country's economic destiny.

In Canada, culture and the state have taken a route that Meinecke never envisaged. Outside of Quebec, a homogeneous community's sense of identity did not flower into art, poetry and historical writing. Culture made its first appearance as a collective phenomenon, as a collective sentiment of denial and expectation. Like the idea of the crusade in the Middle Ages, to which it has sometimes been compared, nationalism preceded and announced the real crusades, which were directly or indirectly supported by the state. This phase of growth is now at midstream. The trumpeting headlines, inaugural addresses and royal commissions persist; but nationalism is also influencing the education system and even the fabric of society. People living in Canada have grown used to marching music and symbolic parades. It is no longer considered unusual for a government body to take a position against outsiders, foreigners in Canada, or unachieved Canadians. Popular opinion has been aroused and at the moment a consensus in a land whose habitable regions are about as wide as the Low Countries and two thirds as long as Russia. Even a few years ago it would have been hard to think of un-Canadian activities, now there are several possibilities. Then the cultural scene had a few high priests but no established church. Now it has one, presided over by the gurus of the literary and publishing world, who close cooperation with the other media. One inevitable consequence of a dominant church and ideology is the proliferation of sectarian movements and heresies.

All we knew really was what was going on in Canada: it was very nationalistic indeed. The Group of Seven, of course, were the top boys and anybody else who was adventurous at all just about aspired to the Group of Seven. And I still can't get over the habit we got into—all those painters would go out into the field and do field sketches on Saturday and Sunday. They had, like a painting kit....

The stimulus of a wider audience transformed Bush from a conservative landscape artist into a radical abstractionist. [In] 1968, my painting began to sell, first in New York, then in London, and then in Canada, which is the usual habit. [Even before] some of us began to break off from the Group of Seven, being influenced by Picasso and Matisse and some of the abstract art we'd started to see. We started to wonder, my God, when did this start to happen?

In literature, by and large, it has not happened. At the International Poetry Festival held in Toronto in October 1975 some good Canadian poetry was read, including that of Miss Atwood, who has a large following in both Canada and the United States. But most of it had about the same effect on figures like Thom Gunn as the Ontario wine so thoughtfully provided by the government for the occasion: one taste was enough.

Too much of the debate on nationalism has been carried on by spokesmen for literature. The limitations of Miss Atwood's thesis

maple leaves; it achieves its considerable impact through timeless and placeless internationalism. It is, so to speak, the literary equivalent of Canadian foreign policy in the 1950s. But what would the same reader think if he chanced upon Margaret Atwood's *Survival*, a thematic guide to Canadian literature prepared for the schools? This is nationalism with a vengeance. Miss Atwood's thesis is that "every country has a single unifying and informing symbol at its core". Canada's is survival. In any other Western country such a notion would be dismissed as a figment of the undergraduate imagination. But in Canada it expresses an important partial truth which, *mutatis mutandis*, applies equally to French and to English. It is also as true of economic affairs as of culture.

In planning, Canada has never overcome two hangovers of colonialism, the clinging to resources as the chief generator of wealth and the resort to tariffs and other forms of protection in place of real competition in literature, there were no valuable resources to build upon. So they were invented. The result was the "Can It" industry. Literature occupied the place of other staples; its themes, until recently, were limited to Canadian flora and fauna. There was not considered a suitable place to look for the whole range of human experience. Like timber, nickel and the caribou, literature was a territorial resource.

But survival is only half the problem. The other half, which Miss Atwood does not touch upon, has to do with the ideological and intellectual function of literature. In Canada, literary activity did not produce something distinctively national; rather, a national instinct for self-preservation gave rise to a large body of writing. Can it claim, then, to have brought about a historic adaptation of the wider themes of Western literature to the Canadian experience? Has it not, in obedience to the laws of demand, only elevated to the status of a national ideal what has always been a part of the Canadian scene? Here, comparison with painting is instructive, since the Group of Seven very early deforested a region of national sensibility. Later artists have had to work out their own relation to an indigenous tradition. Jack Bush, Canada's leading abstractionist, describes his own translation from conventional works like "Fall Day-Caledon" (1938), through "Break Through" (1959), to fully international paintings like "Vaut" (1967) and "Bond" (1971).

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are apparent if one sets it beside a classic of sociology like *The Veil of the Gods*, a historical study like Michael Katz's *The People of Hamilton, Canada West*, or the exploration of modes of thought and feeling in John O'Neill or Marshall McLuhan. One may also question whether literary criticism represents the best in Canadian thinking. There is possibly greater vitality in the tradition of economic history that runs from the late Harold Innis to the present day of village studies in North America. Amosue Radfils. Although survival may be an important issue, it is not acceptable as a unitary criterion of either the imaginative life or society. In both areas the realities defy such radical simplifications. Nor is it a programme for positive action. *The Report of the Commission on Canadian Studies of the Association of Universities and Colleges of Canada* unequivocally stated: "Patriotic appeals to preserve and develop Canadian identity do not constitute, in practice or in principle, an adequate rationale for building a national identity and education. But Canadians have always had a genetic weakness for big, authoritative ideas. Under their weight healthy diversity can easily be crushed. In former times they longed for greater freedom and a novel. Nowadays they want a single, fixed identity."

There is, to be sure, a Canadian identity as many unsuspecting visitors from south of the border have discovered. But it is understated and largely unarticulated. It is like the history of one's family: all the members know what it is about, and no one bothers to write it down. In Canada, literary activity did not produce something distinctively national; rather, a national instinct for self-preservation gave rise to a large body of writing. Can it claim, then, to have brought about a historic adaptation of the wider themes of Western literature to the Canadian experience? Has it not, in obedience to the laws of demand, only elevated to the status of a national ideal what has always been a part of the Canadian scene? Here, comparison with painting is instructive, since the Group of Seven very early deforested a region of national sensibility. Later artists have had to work out their own relation to an indigenous tradition. Jack Bush, Canada's leading abstractionist, describes his own translation from conventional works like "Fall Day-Caledon" (1938), through "Break Through" (1959), to fully international paintings like "Vaut" (1967) and "Bond" (1971).

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Nationalism then, despite its benign intentions, has given rise to all the predictable abnormalities. It has given weaklings a flag to lead behind. It has offered up an obvious victim to the scapegoat theory of history. It has accepted as a virtue for its own sake, at the expense of the public good, the erected false boundaries and enforced false sanctions. It has legitimized mediocrity and admitted a double standard for culture. It has placed the ideological self in front of many of Canada's real problems—its economic planning, regional disparities and endemic political instability. In many ways it has made the country smaller, not larger.

Yet, despite its many failings, the national movement is one overtaking virtue: it is the only universal force in the country. Without it, Canada would probably undergo psychological disintegration. All the positive accomplishments of the past generation would be dissolved by particularism. For the mature, presently staid, the wide institutions that effect cultural activity nearly all operate at the regional or local level. There are many examples. No Canadian university recruits on a national basis, as do Harvard and Yale or Oxford and Cambridge. Ravelston

is a provincial responsibility, as a report noted, and the OECD. Canada has shown little interest in developing national goals. There is no Library of Congress or British Library. The National Library in Ottawa, both by the nature of its collection and its location, is less use to scholars than the Robert Research Library in Toronto.

Anyone living outside the Ottawa region needs a personal lot to profit from the National Arts Centre. The National Gallery is only now acquiring permanent headquarters. Canada has no equivalent of *The Times* or *Le Monde*, National and municipal issues dominate *The Globe and Mail* and *Le Devoir*; international events are merely fed in by the wire service. There is no truly national political magazine, although several try to play that role. Nor is there a widely read review of literature or the visual and performing arts. Canada has no national academy that acts as a forum for the learned disciplines. The Royal Society is just a large, unwieldy club, and the Humanities Research Council has virtually no money, no permanent meeting place for its members and, until recently, had no full-time director. There is no national symphony. The National Ballet is really a Toronto company. The CBC maintains a national network for radio and television but it has recently reduced the budget for Canadian drama to the point where new performances are impossible. The Canadian Council paralyzes the sciences and social sciences everywhere, but its funds are distributed in bits and pieces. More than once it has bowed to regional political interests. The Governor General's Award for literature exists, but one is never sure that all the relevant titles reach the judges.

The lack of a national focus is

observable in other areas. Montreal and Toronto are not small versions of Paris and London; they are just provincial capitals. To date, the provinces of Canada have not even been able to agree on a formula for bringing home the British North America Act. In short, Canada is a cultural Switzerland, a mosaic of racial, legal and institutional checks and balances. Therefore, it is not surprising that Canadians' loyalties are often regional. A man from the Auvergne knows that he is both *français* and *auvergnat*. A Canadian from Newfoundland, Quebec, or Alberta, if he does not travel widely, will carry throughout his life the stamp of a deeply local patriotism. This state of affairs may be one of Canada's strengths. But it gives a special twist to the issue of nationalism. There is a wide gap between theory and practice. The nationalist sentiment requires universalistic institutions, but national experience is subdivided into regional clusters. Unless larger attachments develop, nationalism is in danger of becoming just another nationalized enterprise, an uncompetitive business propped up with government aid.

For the government's use: that is the knotty side of the question. Over the past decade, nationalism has slowly but surely infiltrated the bureaucracy and the media. It has gradually acquired the status of an official culture. Every country has some sort of official culture which is reserved at home for flag-waving ceremonies and exported like duty-free liquor to liberal abroad. In most countries it is not taken seriously. In Canada there is a possibility that it will be mistaken for the real article. The problem is not one of extremism, although Canadian nationalism has been movements and admirers of fascism. It is the danger that nationalism will be exploited by government to make up for the failure of its own policies. This is the case in science. As the bureaucracy, in support response to national need, has swelled, science itself, as creative research, has become progressively impoverished. In scientific and technological research and development

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Canada is rapidly slipping into third-rate status. Part of the responsibility rests with the misadventures of the nation's economic planners since the Second World War. Instead of guiding Canada towards self-sufficiency they created a state of ever-increasing dependency. But the major blame is the government's. Since 1970 at least, successive budgets for medical and other experimental work have been steadily reduced. The government has also resorted to taking all research grants, thus taking money out of one pocket and putting it into another. The false austerity and feather-bedding have fooled no one. John Polanyi, leading chemist at the University of Toronto, recently wrote:

Our neglect of science is something that sets us clearly apart from countries with which we might reasonably compare ourselves. In the United States, in France, in Germany, even in beleaguered Britain, the support of basic science has roughly kept pace with inflation. Only in Canada has inflation been used year after year, as a device for diminishing the nation's investment in this fundamental activity.

It is arguable that, in the short run, the humanities may flourish even while the sciences wither and die. But in the long run, in a highly industrialized country, the two are closely linked. Despite the commitment of the government to an overtly nationalistic post-Canada, a long way from control of its natural resources, sound economic planning, or a mature science policy.

The humanities have fared better. The writing of Canadian history has never been at a higher level. Dance, drama and music are well-supported across the country. Poetry is being overpublished. In general, Canada is a more articulate and self-aware nation than it was a generation ago, and the credit is due to a determined nationalist movement. But the next stage may not be so easy. Nationalism, if it is not to become a set of hollow slogans, must be

transformed from good intentions into a programme of action. As a first step, the air should be cleared. The lavishly subsidized Canadiana industry should be allowed to die a natural death. The muscular official culture should be buried quietly somewhere north of Great Slave Lake. Then some concrete steps could be taken for strengthening culture at the national level.

To my mind, anyone's list of priorities should include three items. One is the breaking down of artificial barriers between the provincial education systems, so that biculturalism can work, duplication of effort be eliminated and excellence surface at the national level.

Canada has the talent for one, or perhaps two, graduate schools of international stature, not twenty. Equally important is the development of a flexible foreign policy for culture. The greatest threat to Canadian survival is not the lack of a national identity but the ignorance of Canadian history and institutions in the United States. So retrograde has Canada been in this area that it often does not have mature cultural relations with the countries that have provided its most dynamic ethnic groups. For instance, despite a large Italian minority, there is no Canadian school among the eighty or so national academies in Rome.

Finally, to achieve greater self-sufficiency in culture, Canada must, through both public and private means, continue to give strong support for the arts, asking only that a fair proportion of the productive processes take place within its borders. This last is particularly important. Canadians have always had a tendency to view culture as a product rather than a process. Accordingly, they have sought to regulate it through content quotas. There is a lesson in the history of all great cultural centres that they have not learnt. One cannot, as Melnick suggested, legislate culture into existence; one can only favour the conditions in which genuinely creative people can work.

## On the streets

By L. J. Sharpe

GEORGE A. NADER:  
Cities of Canada  
Volume 2: Profiles of Fifteen Metropolitan Centres  
460pp. Canada: Macmillan, \$Can18.95.

Profiles of Fifteen Metropolitan Centres is the second of two volumes in the "Canadian urban system", that is to say, it is an account of the physical characteristics of most of the major cities in Canada. Comprehensiveness has been sacrificed in favour of geographical spread, and some of the larger cities in Ontario and Quebec have been omitted. Each of the fifteen cities selected, from St. John's in the extreme east to Victoria in the far west, receives its due portion of pages, and each city is dealt with in the same way: noted history first, then the city's economy and land-use patterns and finally a discussion of recent and current land-use planning policy.

George Nader must clearly be awarded an alpha for industry and anyone with a desire to know most of the primary job-economic facts on the major urban centres of Canada will be well served by his labours. Dr. Nader supplements his text liberally with tables and even more liberally with maps, and he includes a sprinkling of photographs.

Occasionally one of his facts kindles the imagination: Victoria's downtown street lamps—a tourist's delight—evidently are cast-offs from Walsall; Water Street in St. John's is the oldest thoroughfare in North America; during the period 1841 to 1859 Canada's capital switched between Toronto, Kingston, Montreal and Ottawa, by my calculations, something like eight times. Viewed as a whole, however, the book is very difficult to digest, and before we reach the last stage one city has merged with another. Which city was it that was founded by a French voyageur, had that disastrous fire in 1855, suffered a slump at the turn of the century and allowed the first tower office blocks to grace its skyline in the wake of the post-war boom in the early 1960s?

The question that hovers over the enterprise is what purpose does the book serve, other than as a reference work for undergraduate geography students? Even for

trained planners, it is doubtful whether Dr. Nader's thumbnail sketches will be of much help. No attempt is made to summarize the great mass of data, still less is there any synthesis. We must presume that these tasks were undertaken in Volume 1. If this is in fact the case, then this book is made up of what amounts to the working materials of another. Understandably no academic likes to squander his research data, but a 460-page book that is made up of largely background notes is difficult to justify.

Readers will have to do their own generalizing, and at the risk of repeating what Dr. Nader may have already discussed in Volume 1, the major Canadian urban centres seem to share, to British eyes at least, three primary characteristics. Leaving aside the problem of defining the "true" city, the

## Private worlds

By Howard Brotz

DAVID R. HUGHES and  
EVELYN KALLER:  
The Anatomy of Racism: Canadian Dimensions  
230pp. Books Canada, £4.85 (paperback, £2.60).

This book is a series of loosely connected segments of popularized physical anthropology, genetics, archaeology, history, and sociology. The observations about the contemporary scene are not based on coherent research, but are drawn from secondary sources as the authors move, in their comments, from one group to another. In their discussion of the French, the existence of the Parti Québécois, which stands for a politically independent Quebec, is mentioned. Although they do mention treaties in their discussion of Indians, the complications of these treaties for a native people concerning peoples who are in between two conflicting ways of life are not explored. But one might be forgiven for wishing to have a rational standard of wishes that the writing were less tedious. Without such reflection, racism becomes the basis of a "with it" locution.

The main thesis of this book, which is virtually tacked on as a

first of these characteristics is their extraordinarily rapid growth in the twentieth century. Edmonton, for example, which now has a population of 100,000, was a "Queen of the Prairies" in 1900, bigger than Oxford in 1946. Vancouver has almost doubled in size since 1940. The only city that is smaller than in 1940 is Saint John and Winnipeg, both of which have actually lost population since 1956.

The second common characteristic that emerges from Dr. Hughes and Kaller's descriptive pages is the crucial part played by the ways in the fortunes of almost all of the fifteen cities. In a very real sense, most major Canadian cities were, and in some cases still are, railway towns. The shared characteristic is the importance of the United States. All of the fifteen cities have at some time been affected, and usually with a beneficial effect, by events occurring in the United States. In this sense the story of Canadian cities is very much the story of Canada itself.

conclusion of two pages, is that Canada is an "unjust" society because of the prevalence of "polite" racism. David R. Hughes and Evelyn Kaller give us a not-very-convincing attempt to explain the varying response of political and social change, not the black passenger on the subway, which is not even an observation, but a supposition. They do not mention that John Finlay does not say anything about racism, and that one may suppose it means that the things he discusses, concerning history, even if only adumbrated, camps, pogroms, lynchings, mass deportations, and the use of the state-run propaganda machine which they are supposed to enlighten racial hatred. The absence of light, too often in the earlier chapters, Dr. Finlay's "dichotomous analysis" (his term) of the United States and Britain leaves Canada in a no-man's-land, an afterthought. His from being a truly "just" society, this last term was made into a political slogan by the present Prime Minister when he took office. In fact, despite insights into differences in social styles, Dr. Finlay is a bit of a failure in this regard. He does not give an empirical example of United States history, some American influences in Canada are there, but they are not described as such. This book is an introductory survey, not a critical study. It may account for a certain amount of the early republicanism, but his main point here is that the democratic impulse was more immediately effective in the new United States than in Britain. Yet American republicanism was not a simple matter of democracy, but a complex of more reason in the revolutionary impulse than Dr. Finlay allows, and a more radicalism (which British reformers would utilize) and simultaneous utopianism attached to a utopian idealism which was and is present in all reform movements in the United States.

In what remained of British North America after the American Revolution, democratic developments were stunted. The imperial authorities determined to remedy the absence of democratic influence in the former colonies had suffered. A small population and economic underdevelopment as well as the deference of the French-Canadians following the Conquest, helped to check liberalism. Dr. Finlay's argument is that the French-Canadian society was passive in tone. British North America, then, followed the imperial pattern, not that of the United States, in the early nineteenth century.

What role did the Loyalist migration play in the emerging pattern? Traditionally, the Loyalists are supposed to have brought their " Tory principles with them. But Dr. Finlay argues that the Loyalists became Tories after their migration, responding to the conservative climate of British North America rather than creating it. They imagined a Tory past and became mainstays of a Tory present. The makes of Loyalists, according to Dr. Finlay, originally "differed in no way from the Americans they left behind." Dr. Finlay realizes that "the reader may be wondering why it was necessary to deny that the Loyalists brought their Tory principles with them." He suggests that it was suggested in their Canadian exile. His explanation is a remarkable instance of fidelity to a thesis. He points out: "To say that the Loyalists took their ideology with them is to suggest that the Americans expelled that ideology."

But the argument presented here is that the Americans, far from expelling Toryism, did not have any. In other words, the Tories of the United States were a mere ideological consensus confined to a tiny group of Tories. A third theory shows an even smaller place for American Tories.

JOHN L. FINLAY:  
Canada in the North Atlantic Triangle  
200pp. Oxford University Press, £5.20.

Comparison is unavoidable in the writing of Canadian history. Like any other ex-colonial societies, Canada cannot be understood in isolation from its parent countries. Moreover, the proximity and influence of the United States—part parent, part sibling—has been a complicating factor. Consequently, incidentally, a comparison appears in most works of Canadian history. Some monographs have attempted specifically comparative studies of limited questions while a few short essays have suggested frameworks for general comparison of the United States, Canada and Great Britain. *Canada in the North Atlantic Triangle* is an ambitious and extended essay about large because of the prevalence of "polite" racism. David R. Hughes and Evelyn Kaller give us a not-very-convincing attempt to explain the varying response of political and social change, not the black passenger on the subway, which is not even an observation, but a supposition. They do not mention that John Finlay does not say anything about racism, and that one may suppose it means that the things he discusses, concerning history, even if only adumbrated, camps, pogroms, lynchings, mass deportations, and the use of the state-run propaganda machine which they are supposed to enlighten racial hatred. The absence of light, too often in the earlier chapters, Dr. Finlay's "dichotomous analysis" (his term) of the United States and Britain leaves Canada in a no-man's-land, an afterthought. His from being a truly "just" society, this last term was made into a political slogan by the present Prime Minister when he took office. In fact, despite insights into differences in social styles, Dr. Finlay is a bit of a failure in this regard. He does not give an empirical example of United States history, some American influences in Canada are there, but they are not described as such. This book is an introductory survey, not a critical study. It may account for a certain amount of the early republicanism, but his main point here is that the democratic impulse was more immediately effective in the new United States than in Britain. Yet American republicanism was not a simple matter of democracy, but a complex of more reason in the revolutionary impulse than Dr. Finlay allows, and a more radicalism (which British reformers would utilize) and simultaneous utopianism attached to a utopian idealism which was and is present in all reform movements in the United States.

Dr. Finlay assumes that his readers will be innocent of the systematic knowledge of the history and religion of Western civilization. He begins with a discussion called "The Pre-suppositions of European Society." He considers the political and economic systems of pre-revolutionary Britain, France as the mother country of democracy and the American colonies; the values of the Enlightenment in science; culture and government; and the much the motive, which is obvious social implications of "a trinity of religious styles—Catholic, Calvinist and Unitarian. The author unwittingly gives it away: discussion of the relation of Jews and Italians to the private social world of the British elite they correctly note. It is particularly good that the public sphere does not get lost in the private sphere. To the movements of ideas with a coherent credit, they then point out the many of the members of the elite, minorities have not been the subject, which is really what they should have begun to discuss. That the Loyalist migration played a role in the development of the public sphere is obvious. The makes of Loyalists, according to Dr. Finlay, originally "differed in no way from the Americans they left behind." Dr. Finlay realizes that "the reader may be wondering why it was necessary to deny that the Loyalists brought their Tory principles with them." He suggests that it was suggested in their Canadian exile. His explanation is a remarkable instance of fidelity to a thesis. He points out: "To say that the Loyalists took their ideology with them is to suggest that the Americans expelled that ideology."

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## Anglo-Saxon options

By Arthur Sheps

In the course of industrialization, British North America fell between the British and United States models. Like the United States, it had a domestic industrial revolution, a simple trade economy, retarded industrialization and federal regional antagonisms. The United States freed itself from a neo-colonial economy after the War of 1812, while Canada had to wait until at least the tariff of 1879 and the National Policy. Dr. Finlay is torn between admiring and deprecating Canadian enterprises. The canal and railroad construction and mercantile skills of Upper Canada, and its expansion into the West, are lauded and compared to the United States' accomplishments. On the other hand the small contribution of the French-Canadians to economic development is lamented: they were too inhibited by their absolutist heritage and classical education. And the Canadian preference for centralized banking and economic direction is dismissed as a "refusal to become so aggressively venturesome as the Americans." The result of continued imperial control and colonial habits. This explanation, however, pays too little attention to the need for central planning which a harsh climate and small, dispersed population imposed on British North America. The social impact of industrialization also varied throughout the north Atlantic triangle.

British North American businessmen, unlike Jacksonian entrepreneurs, tried to play gentlemen in public life. Mass education was widespread and higher education was embraced in the United States as desirable concomitants of liberal economic development. In British North America education remained an elitist privilege, traditional in content, limited in accessibility and often under ecclesiastical auspices. These differences suggest variations in the style of liberalism in the three societies. As liberal values were becoming established in the nineteenth century, Canada followed British practices, according to Dr. Finlay. The 1837 rebellions were irrelevant attempts to impose Jacksonian-style democratic liberalism on the British North American scene. The Catholic sentiments of the dominant Plains and the parochial nationalism of the Rouges in French Canada limited the spread of democratic ideas there. The businessmen, however, were not thorough democrats, even if economic interest sometimes drove them into opposition to imperial policy and dalliance with the Americans.

So British North America experienced a conservative response to British constitutional liberalism with its utilitarianism and deference as well as to established wealth. The chief features of American democracy—active individualism and cheap limited government—were spurned. Canadian Confederation had none of the attributes of popular sovereignty which marked the United States Constitution. There were no referendums or referendums. Legally, at least, Confederation was the gift of the British Parliament and, significantly, control of the northwestern territories was vested in the new Parliament and not in the United States, in the hands of the actual inhabitants. But if Canada maintained British deferential liberalism, it also avoided the conservatism of Jacksonian Tories. Pluralism, a feature of British public life, manifested itself in the toleration of French-Canadian identity and Catholic education. Merging for conformity has been avoided throughout Canadian history. In the manner of the Habsburg Empire, loyalty to the crown allowed for cultural pluralism which is now officially encouraged in Canada.

One difficulty with this account is the exaggeration of the differences between British and American liberalism. Educated middle-class expertise held its place in the United States government despite the seeming opposition of Jacksonian politics. Real social privilege survived and working men generally were not enamoured of the Democracy. James Fenimore Cooper's writings are a better guide, in some respects, to the social reality of Jacksonian America than Tocqueville's. Tocqueville's emphasis on democratic conformity weighs heavily with Dr. Finlay. Britain, he contends, was complicit in political

pluralism while the United States manifested a "tendency towards ideological totalitarianism" which reveals itself in the recurrent appearance of nationalistic and of subversive conspiracies. But Platte repression, the Chartist agitation, or the difficulties of Labour's entry into politics do not suggest that greater commitment to an ideologically differentiated party system on which Dr. Finlay lays such stress.

Nor is it easy to believe that Liberals and Conservatives in 1860 represented a wider political choice than the Democrats and Republicans on the eve of the Civil War. Dr. Finlay also contrasts toleration of French Canada with the rejection of the South. But the South did not merely represent alternative political values. As Lincoln made clear, it was a danger to the foundations and fabric of civilized society. The spread of slavery, not George Fitzhugh's neo-feudalism, was realisted. It is true that many American reformers hoped for conformity to a supposed Anglo-Saxon norm of political purity and were suspicious of immigrants. But these attitudes were matched by many British liberals in domestic policy, in regard to the Empire, and in their reactions to the United States. At the same time, ethnic differences and cultural pluralism have been more persistent in the United States than Dr. Finlay recognizes. Nor have these differences been as great a barrier to political or economic advancement as he claims.

Since the late nineteenth century, war, technology, and economic depressions have led to attacks against liberal capitalism. In the United States, these attacks were themselves often nostalgic calls for a return to liberal values. In Britain and Canada the challenges have been more varied. There were pressures from the right, but Dr. Finlay finds these from the left in the social movements. In the United States the social movements were violently rejected and have never established themselves. Canadians followed the British pattern and absorbed a pragmatic socialist movement into the democratic movement of political life. (Again, the influence of the English and French Canadian is the exception, not the rule.) The authority of United States based labour unions in English-speaking Canada retarded the workers' commitment to socialism but the influence of British immigration and example prevailed.

Now, it is true, as Dr. Finlay points out, that the public acceptance of a moderate political success of a socialist movement constitutes a difference between Canadian and American liberalism. But one should not exaggerate the significance of this achievement. Historians such as W. M. Dick have recently shown that the influence of the Comintern on the socialists in the 1920s was not as great as the socialists seem to think. In neither Britain nor Canada was working-class socialism accepted without violence. Canadian workers appear to have rejected the thorough approach of the British Labour Party, which remains a political option in Britain and they are closer to the Americans than to the British in their social attitudes. The presence of parties describing themselves as socialist may mark off Canada's political culture from that of the United States, but it has not altered greatly the shape of daily life. A suggestive stimulation of political culture is valuable but it cannot alone answer the question about the Canadian identity which is the real subject-matter of Canadian historical writing.

There is no exaggeration to call Hamilton an instant city. In the years between the time it officially became a city in 1846, when it housed only a few thousand people, and the end of the century, its population increased 150 per cent. Thus Michael B. Katz in his analysis of the structure of the social structure of a typical North American "commercial" city of the mid-nineteenth century, *The People of Hamilton* (Cambridge, 1975, Harvard University Press, £10.50). Professor Katz explores in close detail family, class and ethnic relationships within Hamilton, drawing on the records of the whole population found in the city census, on city directories, newspapers, not news-papers and other sources. This work is an addition to the series *Harvard Studies in Urban History*.

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## Entering the lists

MARGOT J. FAWCETT (Editor):  
The 1976 Corpus Almanac of Canada  
The annual handbook of Canadian business, scientific, cultural and government affairs  
975pp. Toronto: Corpus Publishers  
Regional, \$Can25.95.

Oxford Regional Economic Atlas:  
The United States and Canada  
Second Edition  
128pp. Oxford University Press.  
£8 (paperback, £3.75).

The Corpus Almanac seems oddly named, because as a reference book its designation ought surely to be that of a directory. The abundant data crowded into its pages appear mostly in the shape of lists—of banks, trade unions, associations and societies. Mr. Fawcett's government departments and officials, organized sports. There is even a list of "important people" who have been in the drawing of the last and building of tables dominates the presentation.

Besides all this there are informational notices with details of such matters as Canadian law, the education system, regional geography, and the past and present of the drawing of the last and building of tables dominates the presentation. All very commendable, and doubtless indispensable; but it does not make an almanac, not even by extension the first ten pages on a "Notable" in Canada in 1975. Including a section which deals with Old Moore by means of some early-nominal details—these expand on

duly the concept of a reference book about Canada when they include material on the nature of the universe, complete with snippets about quassars, black holes and other cosmological novelties.

Less all-inclusive than that section would suggest, but still somewhat sweeping, is the book's territory above quassars, black holes and other cosmological novelties. The "annual handbook of Canadian business, scientific, cultural and government affairs." Cultural? Not so you would notice. Yes, a page or so mentions museums and galleries, but falls far short of providing a list: only a note of official bodies from which such lists can be obtained. Again, there is a directory-list of publishers and magazines, and within the latter such journals as *Hog Guide*, or *Snout*, or *mobile Trade* necessarily earn a line or two. But the sub-section dealing with literary magazines, reveals a staggering inadequacy when it ignores a considerable handful of major periodicals including *Canadian Literature*, the *McMaster Review*. In the end it says much about Canadian priorities: by your standards you shall be known.

The Oxford atlas, however, is an atlas, and a highly informative one in which the cartographers and designers have made judicious, thoughtful and attractive use of colour. The symbol keys that help the reader find his way through the map are a relief of the page. They also help remind us that, in North America, the natural lines of communication, and similarity, run north and south. And therefore, inevitably, do the lines of economic and cultural domination/dependence relationship.

Douglas Hill















